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PRESIDENTIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION
David A. Strauss*
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
May the executive branch disagree with the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of the Constitution, and act in accordance with its own
view? We tend to associate this question with a few great constitu-
tional crises. Disputes between President Jackson and the Supreme
Court over the Bank of the United States; between President Lincoln
and the Court over slavery; and between President Franklin
Roosevelt and the Court over New Deal legislation, all produced
memorable statements by presidents claiming a broad power to act
independently from the Court's decisions. The school desegregation
controversy was between the Court and some state governments, not
the President, but it too produced a memorable sweeping statement,
this time by the Court, framed in terms that would deny presidential
independence.'
The question does not just arise at times of crisis, however.
Every day, officers or employees in the executive branch must inter-
pret the Constitution. By and large, of course, the powers of the exec-
utive branch are defined by'statutes, and the executive branch
determines the limits of its power by interpreting those statutes. But
Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, the University of Chicago. This is a revised version
of a paper given at a conference on "Executive Branch Interpretation of the Law" at the
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law on November 15, 1992. The Russell Baker Scholars
Fund and the Robert B. Roesing Faculty Fund at the University of Chicago Law School pro-
vided financial support.
See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
I will use "executive branch" and "President" interchangeably. There is a difference be-
tween a presidential decision and other executive branch decisions, but in general the differ-
ence will not be material to the arguments I consider. Indeed, the difference seems to be
overstated in general. Often the decision of the President is treated as if it were the act of a
unitary, purposive actor. In fact, presidential decisions are routinely the product of interest
group and bureaucratic pressures within the executive branch. "Presidential" decisions are
not automatically more unitary than "congressional" decisions. The degree to which presiden-
tial decisions are the product of intra-executive interest group and bureaucratic factors is an
empirical question that I do not deal with here. See generally Mark A. Peterson, The Presi-
dency and Organized Interests: White House Patterns of Interest Group Liaison, 86 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 612 (1992); Nelson W. Polsby, Interest Groups and the Presidency, in AMERICAN
POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (Walter D. Burnham & Martha W. Weinberg eds., 1978). But
it seems doubtful that an interpretation of the Constitution nominally made by the President
should, for that reason alone, be treated differently from interpretations made (by persons with
the authority to make them) elsewhere in the executive branch.
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sometimes statutes authorize executive action up to the limits of the
Constitution. A statute might explicitly incorporate constitutional
standards. Or, more commonly, a statute might, if read literally, au-
thorize some actions that would violate the Constitution. Almost al-
ways Congress does not intend to authorize the executive to violate
the Constitution; rather, the best interpretation of the statute is that it
implicitly incorporates the constitutional limit. For example, some
law enforcement statutes authorize a range of actions, including
searches and arrests, without explicitly requiring probable cause. In
all likelihood, the best understanding of these statutes is that Congress
intended the executive to observe constitutional limits. In such cases
the executive branch must interpret the Constitution before it can de-
cide what to do, and the executive branch might decide to disagree
with the Court's interpretation.
So, for example, whenever a federal law enforcement officer de-
cides whether there is probable cause for an arrest, the executive
branch has interpreted the Fourth Amendment; whenever federal em-
ployees are disciplined for statements they made, the executive branch
has interpreted the First Amendment; whenever a federal official de-
termines that a regulation, authorized by statute, would go too far
and therefore constitute a taking of property without just compensa-
tion, that official has interpreted the Fifth Amendment. Indeed, if it
makes sense to individuate occasions on which the executive branch
interprets the Constitution (it probably does not),2 they are almost
certainly more common than occasions on which the courts interpret
the Constitution.
Often the executive branch's interpretation of the Constitution
will be reviewed by the courts. This does not obviate the question
whether the executive can disagree with the courts, but it makes that
question less acute in practice. That is because the executive is much
less likely to assert the power to interpret the Constitution autono-
mously when the courts are likely to overturn the executive's action.
During some extraordinary times, presidents have been willing to take
positions in litigation that they knew were very likely to be rejected by
the Supreme Court. Lincoln's reaction to the Dred Scott decision
2 It is relatively easy to identify individual acts of interpretation by the courts because
courts are passive institutions. They are authorized to act only when a specific request is
made, and then they must act in some way. Sometimes administrative agencies are passive in
this way, but often agencies may act without being requested to do so. In such cases, it is
difficult or impossible to identify individual instances of inaction. For example, law enforce-
ment agencies must decide how much of their resources to devote to preventing crime, but it
would be impossible to identify each specific occasion in which a law enforcement agency
decided against taking action to prevent crime.
[Vol. 15:113
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(although of course the matter was settled by war, not litigation) and
Roosevelt's pursuit of New Deal legislation are examples. But usually
the executive branch will not take an action that it expects will be
declared unlawful by the Supreme Court. The "nonacquiescence"
policy that attracted much attention a few years ago involved execu-
tive decisions to take actions that were certain to be rejected by the
courts of appeals, not actions of a kind that the Supreme Court had
condemned.' In fact, the principal rationale for the policy was that
the executive branch was entitled to persist in its policies until the
Supreme Court had rejected them.
Often the executive will try to stretch the Court's precedents to
the limits of what is "defensible," but it will seldom go further. From
time to time the executive will ask that a precedent be overruled, but
except in extraordinary circumstances, the executive will continue to
comply until it is overruled. Theoretically, the executive could assert
the power to disagree with Supreme Court interpretations of the Con-
stitution and act on its own view, even in cases that will end up in
court. But as a practical matter, it very seldom does so.
Many executive branch interpretations of the Constitution will
not be reviewed in court, however. Sometimes no one will have stand-
ing, or the case will be moot before there is a chance for review, or no
one will have a sufficient incentive to sue, or an immunity defense
(sovereign or official, absolute or qualified) will preclude review on the
merits. This category of cases is large and significant enough to make
the question of executive autonomy in constitutional interpretation
very important practically, as well as theoretically. In large numbers
of cases involving law enforcement or personnel actions, for example,
the person affected by the government's action simply will not com-
plain in court. Then the executive's interpretation is the final word.
In many of these cases, of course, there is no serious issue about the
legal standard; if the executive acts inconsistently with Supreme
Court precedents, it does so by ignoring or shading the facts, not by
rejecting the precedents. This probably occurs because the bureaucra-
cies involved, such as the law enforcement agencies, are trained-in
anticipation of frequent litigation-to follow the standards prescribed
by the courts.
But in other categories of decisions, in which the issue seldom
ends up in court, the executive is less oriented to the courts' views and
the question of executive autonomy in interpreting the Constitution
3 See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judg-
ments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43 (1993); Michael S. Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the
Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81 (1993).
1993]
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arises. For example, intelligence and law enforcement agencies rou-
tinely take actions that raise Fourth Amendment issues but that law-
fully remain secret. As a result, unless there is a breach of security,
no one will discover that an individual's rights may have been vio-
lated. Government agencies sometimes must decide whether certain
expenditures of public funds are consistent with the Constitution-for
example, with the Establishment Clause,4 or with the clause requiring
"a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures
of all public Money" 5-when the constitutional limits are not judi-
cially enforceable.6 Many important separation of powers issues,
ranging from the President's authority to commit troops to the execu-
tive branch's right to withhold internal documents from Congress, are
likely to be declared nonjusticiable by the courts. In these instances,
the executive's determination of the constitutional issue will be the
final word (unless Congress can make a different view prevail).
These kinds of questions arise quite frequently; they are everyday
issues for some government lawyers. Because they will not end up in
court, the executive will not suffer an adverse judgment if it interprets
the Constitution autonomously. There may be other practical re-
straints on the ability of the executive branch to depart from judicial
interpretations, such as public opinion or legislative pressure, but
often these decisions will not be sufficiently visible to generate such
responses. As a result, the executive branch will be free to interpret
the Constitution autonomously in these cases, raising the question
whether it may lawfully do so.
My principal argument in this paper is that there is no simple,
comprehensive answer to that question. (Since simple answers have
often been suggested, maybe this is not as inconsequential a conclu-
sion as it seems.) The answer depends on the particular constitutional
provision at stake, and it requires difficult judgments of institutional
competence. In the end, the question of the proper scope of executive
autonomy in constitutional interpretation is as complex and difficult
to answer as the question of the proper scope of judicial review.
I will suggest a few principles that, nonetheless, might be applied
in practice to determine the limits of executive autonomy in constitu-
tional interpretation. I am mostly concerned, however, with refuting
a particular view that has been asserted by presidents from time to
4 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
6 See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (Establishment Clause); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166
(1974) (Statement and Account Clause).
[Vol. 15:113
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time and seems to have become especially popular in the last decade:
the view that the President is sometimes entitled to claim direct access
to "the Constitution," unmediated by constitutional law as the courts
have developed it."
L THE SCOPE OF THE ISSUE
First it is worth clarifying when this question-the extent to
which the executive branch may differ with the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of the Constitution-arises. In order to keep the issue in
focus, I will limit the inquiry to the kind of case I described above, in
which the statute that authorizes executive action explicitly or implic-
itly incorporates a constitutional limit.
I limit the question this way because executive interpretation of
the Constitution is often discussed in connection with quite different
issues, without a recognition of the complexity that those issues intro-
duce. For example, the question when the executive may disagree
with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution is some-
times treated as equivalent to the question when the Presidentmay
refuse to enforce an act of Congress on the ground that it violates the
Constitution. This issue raises a question about executive autonomy
in interpreting the Constitution, of course, but it also raises another
difficult, and logically prior, question of constitutional law, about the
substantive requirements of the Take Care Clause of the Constitu-
tion.8 The two questions are related; the concerns they raise about the
President's role in the constitutional scheme are roughly similar. But
they are distinct in the sense that answering the question about execu-
tive autonomy does not automatically answer the question about the
Take Care Clause.
Suppose, for example, that Congress were to reenact the In-
dependent Counsel statute, altered in some way to make it even more
questionable constitutionally than the provisions upheld in Morrison
v. Olson.9 For example, Congress might further lower the level of
evidence of wrongdoing needed before the Attorney General is re-
quired to seek the appointment of an Independent Counsel, or it
might expand the class of covered officials. The President would have
to decide whether to comply with the statute. One issue would be
7 See Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987); Merrill,
supra note 3, at 49.
s U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Not just the Take Care Clause, but any constitutional require-
ment, explicit or implicit, that concerns the President's obligations to comply with acts of
Congress.
9 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
19931
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whether the President was free to view Morrison v. Olson as limited to
its facts or, even more strongly, to view it as Lincoln viewed Dred
Scott, as having no generative force at all. 10
Before the President could even reach that question, he would
have to interpret the Take Care Clause. Even if the President is en-
tirely free to disregard all judicial precedent in deciding whether the
Independent Counsel provisions are constitutional, it is still theoreti-
cally possible that the Take Care Clause, properly interpreted, re-
quires the President to comply with all acts of Congress that are not
utterly indefensible. Or it is possible (indeed, quite likely) that the
Take Care Clause, properly understood, requires some lesser, but still
substantial, degree of deference to the constitutional judgments im-
plicit in Congress's decision to enact a law. Then, even if the Presi-
dent were entitled to disagree with the Supreme Court, it would not
be enough for the President to conclude that the Independent Counsel
statute was unconstitutional; he would have to conclude that its un-
constitutionality was sufficiently clear to overcome his duty to defer to
Congress.
6r suppose the correct interpretation of the Take Care Clause is
that the President must comply with any statute that is not clearly
unconstitutional unless that statute infringes the President's preroga-
tives. (I believe this is generally the view of the executive branch.)
According to this view, the President would be entitled to disregard
the new Independent Counsel statute if he concluded that it was un-
constitutional, all things considered, even if a substantial argument
could be made in its defense.
In every case, however, the question whether the President may
refuse to comply With an act of Congress is distinct from the question
whether he must treat Supreme Court precedent as binding. It is co-
herent to say that the executive may disregard the new Independent
Counsel statute if it is, on balance, unconstitutional, but in deciding
whether it is unconstitutional, the executive must treat Morrison v.
Olson as a binding precedent. And it is coherent to say that the Presi-
dent may disagree with Morrison and legitimately decide that it
should be given no generative force, but the President still must com-
ply with acts of Congress no matter how unconstitutional they are. It
may turn out that the answer to the question about executive auton-
10 Apparently, in a previous Administration, the Department of Justice did take an exceed-
ingly narrow view of Morrison v. Olson. See John 0. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Func-
tion of the Attorney General: A Normative, Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 375, 432 (1993).
[Vol. 15:113
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omy suggests a particular answer to the question about the Take Care
Clause, but they remain distinct questions.
A similar issue arises (although the stakes are lower) about the
positions the executive may take in advocacy. For example, may the
executive urge the courts to interpret the Constitution in a way that
favors criminal defendants on the ground that the opposing position,
while defensible, is on balance incorrect? This question obviously
raises the issue about executive autonomy in interpreting the Consti-
tution. But the prior question is how one defines the limits on the
executive's role as an advocate. The government is always an enforcer
of the criminal laws; it is virtually never a defendant.' Is it nonethe-
less consistent with the Take Care Clause, and a proper exercise of
"the Executive Power," for the government to advocate a position
that helps criminal defendants?
There are parallel questions about the civil rights laws, the anti-
trust laws, and limits on government regulation. Similar questions are
raised in cases in which the government has little discernable institu-
tional interest on either side. But these issues-which again are eve-
ryday matters for some government lawyers--depend first on
questions about the scope of the executive's power that are distinct
from the question whether the executive may differ from the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Constitution.
II. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AS AN INFERIOR COURT?
There are two polar views on the question of how autonomous
the executive may be in interpreting the Constitution. One view is
that the executive branch must follow Supreme Court precedents to
the same extent as lower federal courts. If precedents are in tension,
or if no useful precedent exists, the executive branch may have some
latitude to choose between them based on its own views about what
the Constitution requires. On many issues (particularly those that are
seldom or never litigated), this may give the executive a great deal of
autonomy in practice. But the executive branch may not disregard a
Supreme Court precedent solely on the ground that the decision is
wrong.
Few people seem to embrace this view of the executive branch's
role explicitly, but I think something like it is common among execu-
tive branch lawyers. Supreme Court precedents, and sometimes even
lower court precedents, set the boundaries within which the executive
i1 Government officials are sometimes criminal defendants in prosecutions for actions
committed in their official capacity, and the government may have an interest in their defense.
I leave this interest aside for purposes of the discussion in the text.
1993]
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branch operates. That is what "the law" is. For reasons I suggested
above, this outlook is likely to be especially common among lawyers
who anticipate litigation, but it is also, I think, widespread among
lawyers who do not. The idea that there is some law distinct from
Supreme Court precedents seems metaphysical to them. One can dis-
agree with Supreme Court precedents, of course, and even seek to
have them overruled, but the idea that the executive branch should
follow a different law is, I think, foreign to most government lawyers.
It seems relatively easy to show that this view is wrong in theory.
But when we try to decide on how autonomous the executive branch
may be, the prevalence of this view in the executive branch (if I am
right that it is prevalent) should not be ignored.
The principal reason to reject this view is that the executive
branch is not hierarchically subordinate to the Supreme Court. The
Constitution treats the executive as a coordinate branch. As such, the
executive should have at least as much autonomy in dealing with
Supreme Court precedents as the Court itself has. At the very least,
the executive branch should be free to "overrule" and limit Supreme
Court precedents in ways that the lower courts may not.
The idea that the executive branch may treat Supreme Court
precedents in the way that the Court itself does is a departure from
what I suggested is the common view among government lawyers.
But even this notion-that the executive branch is limited to acting as
the Court itself does-seems arbitrary to a degree. Many of the
Court's decisions reflect its sense of its own institutional limits. The
executive has different institutional limits, and that implies an ap-
proach to Supreme Court precedent that may be different even from
the Court's own.
To some extent, of course, the duty to follow Supreme Court pre-
cedent (the qualified duty of the Supreme Court and the more une-
quivocal duty of the lower courts) rests on the need for stability and
predictability. But the executive branch can take those needs into ac-
count when arriving at its own interpretations of the Constitution.
Sometimes precedents should be overruled despite the cost to stability
and predictability. Unless one can identify a reason why the executive
branch should always accept the Supreme Court's determinations of
when stability and predictability should give way, the executive
should be free to make that determination for itself.
III. COMPLETE EXECUTIVE AUTONOMY?
The other polar position is the one taken, more or less explicitly,
[Vol. 15:113
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by various Presidents during great constitutional crises.12 This
view-which has become increasingly popular lately-holds that the
President owes no deference to Supreme Court precedent. The Presi-
dent must comply with the judgments of the Court in particular cases.
Dred Scott must remain a slave; the schools of Topeka must be inte-
grated.13 But the President need go no further in following what the
Court says. His obligation is to the Constitution, not to the constitu-
tional law developed by the courts.
The proponents of this view usually offer two principal argu-
ments. One is the argument I just suggested as a reason for not ac-
cepting the view that the executive branch must act like a lower court.
So far as the text and structure of the Constitution are concerned,
there is no reason to conclude that the executive branch and the judi-
cial branch should be treated differently when it comes to resolving
questions of constitutional interpretation. They are coordinate
branches; neither is explicitly given the power to interpret the Consti-
tution; and both must interpret the Constitution in carrying out their
respective duties.
This argument seems to me substantial, and shortly I will try to
shed light on whether it is correct. But the second argument ad-
vanced in support of executive branch autonomy in constitutional in-
terpretation seems to me incorrect. This argument relies on the fact
that the President, no less than the Justices, takes an oath to uphold
the Constitution. Just as Marbury v. Madison 14 relied partly on the
oath in justifying judicial review, the President, it is argued, has as
much authority as the courts to interpret the Constitution." The
oath, it is sometimes added, is to the Constitution, not to the courts'
interpretations of the Constitution. 6 So necessarily the executive
branch is autonomous.
This argument is question-begging (as was the parallel argument
in Marbury). An oath to uphold the Constitution raises-but does
not answer-the question: what does the Constitution require? The
Constitution might impose a requirement that an official defer to an-
other official's interpretation of the Constitution. It is perfectly plau-
sible to say that the Constitution sometimes requires the President to
enforce a law that he considers, on balance, to be unconstitutional. If
12 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
13 Here, I elide a potentially significant difference between the claim that the executive, a
coordinate branch, may interpret the Constitution autonomously, and the possibly far more
questionable claim that the states may interpret the Constitution autonomously.
14 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
15 See Paulsen, supra note 3, at 86; McGinnis, supra note 10, at 380 n.15.
16 McGinnis, supra note 10, at 380 n.15; see also Paulsen, supra note 3, at 86.
1993]
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that is what the Constitution requires, then the oath requires the Pres-
ident to enforce the law-not to defy the law in pursuit of his own
interpretation of the Constitution. The question of executive auton-
omy in interpreting the Constitution is similar; it is the question of
when, and to what extent, the Constitution requires the President to
defer to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution, as
reflected in its precedent. That question cannot be answered by say-
ing that the President is under an oath to comply with the Constitu-
tion. The question remains: does the Constitution require the
President to defer to another branch on this point?
Millions of government officials and employees, at all levels of
government, take oaths to uphold the Constitution. No one suggests
that all of them are free to act on interpretations of the Constitution
that differ from those of the Supreme Court. It follows that there is
nothing in the nature of the oath that entails autonomy. An oath is
limiting, not empowering. Sometimes it is emphasized that the Presi-
dent's oath is specified in the Constitution itself. 7 That may bear on
the question of executive autonomy because it may be a hint about the
structural position that the President occupies in the Constitutional
scheme. But the fact that the oath is mentioned in the Constitution
does not change its essential nature, which is that it only raises the
question of what the Constitution requires, including what it requires
by way of deference to other components of the government.
The executive autonomy view therefore depends on the struc-
tural argument about the coordinate character of the branches.
Although this argument is much more substantial than the argument
about the oath, it, too, does not entitle the executive branch to act
with complete autonomy in interpreting the Constitution. Specifi-
cally, the problem with the complete autonomy view is that it creates
several anomalies: certain doctrines that no one questions (on any rel-
evant ground) are inconsistent with the complete autonomy view.
A. Official Liability for Damages
Chief among these doctrines is the qualified immunity that limits
government employees' personal liability for damages for constitu-
tional violations. That doctrine provides that government employees
will be liable for damages only for violating constitutional rights that
were clearly established at the time of the violation. 8 "Clearly estab-
lished," under this doctrine, means clearly established in light of the
Court's decisions. If those decisions clearly establish a right, then offi-
17 See McGinnis, supra note 10, at 378; Paulsen, supra note 3, at 86.
18 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 812 (1982).
[Vol. 15:113
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cials can be held liable for infringing it. This doctrine is inconsistent
with the executive autonomy view, but so far as I know no advocate
of executive autonomy has ever questioned it on this ground.
Suppose, for example, that the executive branch decided that
current judicial interpretations of the Fourth Amendment are errone-
ous and that searches can always be undertaken with probable cause,
even without a warrant. The Warrant Clause,19 according .to this
view, was designed to limit the circumstances under which warrants
would be issued not because warrants were needed to authorize
searches but because warrants immunized officials from damages
liability.
This interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is, of course,
sharply at variance with the Court's precedents, which require not
just probable cause but a warrant for a search in all but certain speci-
fied categories of cases. But this hypothetical executive branch inter-
pretation of the Fourth Amendment is certainly not disreputable. It
has substantial support in both the text and the history of the Fourth
Amendment, and arguably it makes more sense than the Court's cur-
rent interpretation.20 If the executive really is entitled to rely on "the
Constitution" instead of the Court's glosses on the Constitution, then
this would be an excellent occasion for the executive branch to di-
verge from the Court.
Nonetheless, it is clear that executive branch employees who con-
ducted warrantless searches would be subject to personal damages.
"Clearly established" means clearly established as a matter of judicial
precedent. Theoretically one could have an immunity doctrine that
interprets clearly established in light of all possible sources of consti-
tutional doctrine. Then, no matter how well settled an issue was as a
matter of Supreme Court precedent, it would not be clearly estab-
lished unless the executive branch could not plausibly have a different
view. The fact that no one (so far as I know), including the most
forceful advocates of executive autonomy, has challenged qualified
immunity doctrine on this ground suggests that the executive auton-
omy view is not taken entirely seriously.
B. The Enforcement of Specific Judgments
The executive autonomy view, in nearly all its manifestations,
pulls its punches in a way that suggests a deeper incoherence. Almost
19 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
20 See, e.g., TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 21-
50 (1969); Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1178-80
(1991).
19931
HeinOnline  -- 15  Cardozo L. Rev.  123 1993 - 1994
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
everyone who advances this view acknowledges that the executive
branch must comply with specific judgments of the Supreme Court
(and even the lower courts).2 The executive branch's autonomy is
limited to denying that the courts' decisions have any precedential,
generative weight.
Why should this be so? The basis of the argument for executive
branch autonomy in constitutional interpretation is that the executive
is a coordinate branch, equal in all respects to the judiciary. If the
judiciary believes that a specific determination made by the executive
branch is unconstitutional, the judiciary may refuse to enforce that
determination. Why should the coordinate executive not have a sym-
metrical power to refuse to enforce a decision by a court if it considers
that decision unconstitutional? 22
One answer sometimes given is that "the judicial power" men-
tioned in Article III of the Constitution is only the power to render
binding judgments in particular cases. 23 But this seems to be no more
than an assertion. There is no reason that the judicial power has to be
given that definition in the face of a supposed structural imperative of
executive autonomy in constitutional interpretation. The judicial
power might, for example, mean that judgments bind private parties
to a case, but that the executive branch's role in complying with or
enforcing judgments is a matter for its own determination.
A more common answer is that it would be too destabilizing, or
too much of an affront to the dignity of the courts, to allow the execu-
tive branch to refuse to enforce a specific judgment. This, too, seems
an odd argument. What is unsettling, and an affront to the courts, is
for the executive branch to refuse to give effect to a Supreme Court
decision in any cases other than the ones that happen to come before
the Court. The incremental effect of defiance in the particular cases
that come before the Court seems minor, even trivial, by comparison.
Even if it is not minor, why draw the line here? Obviously the execu-
tive autonomy view, even if it is limited by requiring compliance with
specific judgments, entails a good deal of instability and affront to the
courts. Why is that just the right amount of instability, while permit-
ting defiance of specific judgments would be too much?
The most likely answer is that this apparently arbitrary feature of
21 Paulsen, supra note 3, at 82; Merrill, supra note 3, at 46.
22 See Paulsen, supra note 3, at 83 for an extended argument to the same effect: that the
executive autonomy view is in tension with the position that the executive branch must comply
with specific judgments. Professor Paulsen, however, draws the conclusion that the executive
branch need not comply with specific judgments. See id. at 84.
23 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 926
(1990).
[Vol. 15:113
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the executive autonomy view in fact reveals a deeper failure. The
view cannot be faithful to its own premises because those premises are
flawed.
C. A False Market Mechanism
There is one additional answer to the anomaly I have just sug-
gested. It might be said that requiring adherence to particular judg-
ments, while permitting the executive branch to refuse to give any
further effect to decisions, provides a means for the conflict between
the branches to be resolved. The executive branch will act in accord-
ance with its own view; it will be sued; eventually, if the Court sticks
to its guns, the executive will lose in court; and at that point, the
executive will have to comply with the specific judgment. Thus
neither the Court nor the executive branch will automatically have
the last word. Ultimately the public will tire of the instability. Either
the executive branch will give in, under the weight of repeated losses
in court, or the courts will give in, recognizing the practical impossi-
bility of enforcing their view generally.
This notion is familiar; a version of it is often advanced as a way
for interbranch conflicts to be resolved generally. Some argue, for
example, that the courts should stay out of certain conflicts between
the executive branch and Congress because those branches can use
their "political weapons" against each other to resolve the dispute.
Suppose, for example, Congress and the President have a dispute over
whether the executive branch acted lawfully in refusing Congress ac-
cess to certain internal documents. To settle the dispute, Congress
can, for example, refuse to confirm various Presidential appointees
unless the President yields access to the documents; conversely, the
President can veto proposed legislation until Congress yields its
position.
The familiarity of this idea tends to blind us to how perverse it is.
It suggests that a dispute between the branches should be resolved by
having each branch take actions that, by hypothesis, it considers to be
contrary to the public interest until one branch finally concedes. In
the example I gave, congressional retaliation would be effective only if
Congress refused to confirm appointments that it would otherwise
have confirmed. The President's response would be effective only if
he vetoed bills that he would otherwise have signed. If each branch
acts in the way it would have acted anyway, then the branches are not
retaliating. It is hard to see why we should choose this method-
inflicting an escalating series of blows to the public interest-as a way
of resolving interbranch disputes.
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Moreover, there is simply no reason to believe that requiring the
executive branch to adhere to specific judgments, while allowing it to
litigate every case fully no matter how clear the precedent, will pro-
duce a satisfactory resolution of the dispute over constitutional inter-
pretation. This method represents one example of the uncritical
adoption of a market-like approach to resolving an issue, without any
of the conditions that enable markets to produce desirable results.24
The outcome of a battle of this kind between the executive and
Congress will be determined mostly by factors that are irrelevant to
the legal merits: the resources and endurance of the private parties
involved; whether many judgments, or only a few, are needed to en-
able the courts' view to prevail; whether the litigation proceeds
quickly; and so on. It is true that this sort of conflict will focus public
attention on the issue, but there are many other means of focusing
public attention. The executive branch, in particular, has many ways
of inducing the public to criticize the courts, if the public is so
minded. In any event, such short-term expressions of public opinion
should not determine constitutional controversies. That is part of the
reason for judicial review in the first place.
D. Deference by the Judiciary
The executive autonomy view also seems to be unable to account
for one of the settled aspects of judicial review that is favorable to the
executive branch (and to Congress). Routinely, the courts will defer
to those branches' interpretations of the Constitution. In foreign and
military affairs, for example, the courts give enormous weight to exec-
utive, especially presidential, interpretations of the Constitution.
Also, in a wide range of cases, it is a truism that statutes are presumed
constitutional because they rest on an implicit congressional interpre-
tation of the Constitution.
The basis of the executive autonomy view is that the three
branches are coordinate and symmetrically situated. If the executive
branch is free to disregard the Supreme Court's views in interpreting
the Constitution, then the Court should be under no obligation to de-
fer to either the President or Congress. If it is sometimes appropriate
24 Other examples include: the use of the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor to justify free
speech (see David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 334, 349 (1991)); the regime under which the Constitution generally permits the gov-
ernment to withhold information but strictly limits the power to keep the press from publish-
ing it once the press gains access to it (see Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of
Information, 74 CAL. L. REV. 889 (1986)); and, more generally, the pluralist model of democ-
racy, under which optimal outcomes are thought to be produced by the competition among
interest groups.
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for the courts to defer to the other branches-and everyone would
agree that it is-then the question is not whether the executive branch
must sometimes accept judicial interpretations. It is instead a matter
of specifying when.
E. Judicial Adherence to Precedent
A final anomaly is that the executive autonomy view has diffi-
culty explaining why the courts themselves should follow precedent,
specifically, why the Supreme Court should ever feel an obligation to
follow its own precedents. Proponents of executive autonomy often
say that the President owes a duty to the Constitution, rather than to
the Court's interpretation of the Constitution. But if that is true, then
the Justices also owe a duty to the Constitution itself, rather than to
previous judicial interpretations of the Constitution. At times, some
Justices have gone quite far in asserting that the Court may disregard
precedent in interpreting the Constitution. But no one, so far as I
know, has ever said that the Court has no obligation of any kind to
follow precedent. A system in which the Court interpreted the Con-
stitution without any regard to precedent is difficult even to imagine.
The proponents of executive autonomy might say that there are
good institutional reasons for the Court to follow precedent. Of
course there are, but that just raises the question of the extent to
which these reasons also apply to the executive branch. This anom-
aly, therefore, points the way toward a view of the executive branch's
role in constitutional interpretation that is more refined and more
plausible than the executive autonomy view.
IV. PRECEDENT AND EXECUTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION
If neither of the polar positions is correct, which intermediate
position seems most plausible? As a first approximation, consider the
following alternative to the polar views: in interpreting the Constitu-
tion, the executive branch is to act, not fully autonomously, and not
like a lower court, but rather like the Supreme Court itself. An execu-
tive branch official interpreting the Constitution should approach the
problem by asking how she would decide if she were a Supreme Court
Justice. Simply ignoring Supreme Court decisions in the area, and
beginning from scratch-a course that some versions of the executive
autonomy view suggest is acceptable and even mandatory-is not the
right approach, because an executive branch decision to disregard a
Supreme Court precedent is comparable to the Court's deciding to
overrule its own precedent. It certainly should not be done lightly,
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especially when the precedent is recent. But it is also not out of the
question, in the way that the other polar view, treating the executive
branch as comparable to a lower court, would suggest.
It might be argued against this position that it is unclear what
"following precedent" entails. Judges, for example, have different
ideas about their obligations to precedent. Some view it as almost
sacrosanct; others are willing to overrule precedents more readily.
But the existence of these different views about the nature of the
Supreme Court's obligation to follow precedent does not in the least
undermine the view that the obligation of the executive branch (as a
first approximation) is to follow precedent to the same extent. Sup-
pose that it were unclear whether the President had an obligation to
adhere to statutes., It would be important to decide whether he did
have such an obligation-even though there is great controversy
about the correct way to interpret statutes. Similarly, it would be val-
uable to determine that the President has an obligation to follow pre-
cedent, even if the precise content of that obligation remains unclear.
Of course, deciding that the President has an obligation to follow pre-
cedent to the extent that the Supreme Court itself does, does not pro-
vide a mechanical way for the President to make decisions about legal
questions. But that is as it should be. Any approach that provided
simple and mechanical answers should be suspect.
This first approximation-that the President has the same obliga-
tion to conform to Supreme Court precedent that the Court itself
has-should nevertheless be modified in several ways. The general
reason for the modifications is that constitutional law, as developed by
the Supreme Court, reflects in part the Court's views of its own insti-
tutional capacities. Since the capacities of the executive branch are
different, executive branch officials who are interpreting the Constitu-
tion should not act in exactly the same way as Supreme Court
Justices.
Apart from these differences in institutional competence, how-
ever, there seems to be no reason for the executive branch to treat
Supreme Court precedent less seriously than the Court itself should
treat it. In particular, the distinction between "the Constitution" and
"constitutional law," drawn by some advocates of the executive au-
tonomy view, is invalid.25
A. Judicial Deference and Circular Buck-Passing
Sometimes the executive branch should interpret the Constitu-
25 See generally Merrill, supra note 3.
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tion to impose stricter limits on its power than the Supreme Court's
decisions themselves suggest. That is because in certain categories of
cases, constitutional law as developed by the Supreme Court reflects
great deference to judgments made by the executive branch. This is
an aspect of the problem of underenforced constitutional norms.
Foreign affairs and the governance of the military are two clear
examples. The Court defers to the executive because it believes it
lacks the capacity to make the necessary judgments. If the executive
branch then accepts the Court's decisions as setting the boundaries of
its authority, the result is circular buck-passing: the courts defer to
the supposed constitutional determinations of the executive, the exec-
utive does whatever the courts allow it to do, and no one ever ad-
dresses the constitutional issue.
Therefore, in defining its power over foreign and military affairs,
the executive branch should develop interpretations of the Constitu-
tion that go beyond the cases in limiting executive power. These cate-
gories are especially important because many executive decisions in
these areas are likely to escape judicial review. In these areas, execu-
tive autonomy in constitutional interpretation should lead to less
power for the executive branch.
Foreign and military affairs are not the only examples. The
courts systematically defer to the expertise of the executive branch in
interpreting the Constitution in other areas as well: controlling federal
institutions such as prisons, managing the federal work force, setting
law enforcement policy, and allocating.the resources available for en-
forcement action by government agencies. In all of these areas, the
coordinate status of the executive branch requires it to be stricter with
itself than the cases are.
Federalism is a somewhat different and more problematic exam-
ple. To some extent (less completely now after last Term's decision in
New York v. United States), 26 the Supreme Court has not enforced
federalism-based limits on Congress's power to legislate. The Court
has reasoned that the political branches will adequately protect the
states' interests. This might be analogous to foreign affairs, where the
courts believe they lack the necessary expertise. If so, then the execu-
tive branch and Congress should enforce stricter limits on their own
power than the cases prescribe. But probably a more plausible inter-
pretation of the Court's approach in this area is not that it believes it
lacks the expertise, but that it believes the normal clash of political
forces in the legislative and executive branches poses no danger to the
26 New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
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states' legitimate constitutional interests. If that is the basis of the
Court's doctrine, then the executive and legislative branches need not
self-consciously adopt a more limited view of their own constitutional
prerogatives than the cases warrant.
B. The Protection of Minorities and the Political Process
One well known justification for the courts' role in constitutional
interpretation is the so-called Carolene Products approach. The idea
is that the courts are better able to protect the interests of minorities
who do not have their fair share of political power and to remove
obstacles in the political process, such as restrictions on speech or
malapportionment of legislatures .
To the extent that this is the basis for a principle of constitutional
law developed by the courts, the executive branch should not adopt
the same attitude as the courts toward the principle. Specifically, the
executive branch should be less willing to depart from a principle jus-
tified in this way than the Court itself would be. The reason is that
constitutional law in these areas is premised on mistrust of the polit-
ical branches, including the executive branch. It follows that if a par-
ticular decision of the Supreme Court is justified on Carolene Products
grounds, the President should follow that decision more closely than
the Court itself would.
This argument suggests that one of the most famous statements
of judicial supremacy, the Supreme Court's opinion in Cooper v.
Aaron,28 may have been right "on the facts," so to speak, even though
it is not right in all cases. Cooper itself, of course, concerned defiance
of Supreme Court precedent by a state government, but the Court's
language was broad enough to reach presidential interpretation of the
Constitution.29 In the narrow area of prohibiting racial discrimina-
tion against minorities, the Court was arguably right in saying that, so
far as constitutional interpretation goes, the autonomy of other actors
in the system is severely limited.
Of course, the Carolene Products justification is controversial,
27 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). I do not refer
here to the portion of the Carolene Products footnote that suggests that the courts have greater
warrant to overturn the decisions of the political branches when "legislation appears on its face
to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amend-
ments." Id.
28 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
29 Id. at 18 ("Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 177 [(1803)] ...declared the basic
principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution,
and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent
and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court ... is the supreme law of the land ....").
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and the notions involved-underrepresented minorities and blockages
in the democratic process-are contested. It may be that this justifi-
cation does not work at all. But to whatever extent it does work, it
must affect the nature of the executive branch's duties when it inter-
prets the Constitution.
This is one of the ways in which the question of executive auton-
omy in interpreting the Constitution is no less complex than the ulti-
mate justification for judicial review. We cannot expect to have a
complete account of the proper sphere of executive autonomy until we
have a complete account of the justification for judicial review. Real-
istically, we will never have either, so we should not be surprised that
the question of executive autonomy in interpreting the Constitution is
complex and not fully resolved.
C. Disputes Between Congress and the Executive
One of the Court's functions is to mediate between the other two
branches when they have constitutional disputes. Decisions in this
area are also entitled to special deference from the executive branch
for essentially the same reason as decisions protecting minorities.
This is an area where the courts, which (by hypothesis) do not have a
stake in the controversy, are likely to do better at interpreting the
Constitution than a branch that does have a stake. The executive
branch should be much less ready to "overrule" a decision mediating
an executive-legislative constitutional dispute than the courts would
be, because the executive branch is acting as a judge in its own cause.
So, for example, in the hypothetical I posed above about a revised
Independent Counsel statute, the executive branch is not entitled to
treat Morrison v. Olson as an incorrect decision and, in applying Mor-
rison to new situations, it should not interpret it more narrowly than
the courts would.
D. Disputes Where the Judicial Branch Has an Institutional
Interest
All of the categories I have discussed so far were instances in
which the executive branch should assert even less power to interpret
the Constitution than the courts do; it should follow the Supreme
Court's precedents more closely than the Court itself would. But
surely there should be instances in which the executive branch can be
more autonomous, that is, where it can depart from precedent more
readily than the Court itself would.
Initially, one might say that just as the executive branch should
follow the Court rather than its own interpretations when the Court
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has adjudicated a matter involving the institutional interests of the
executive branch, so too should the executive branch be more autono-
mous where the Court has been a judge in its own cause, that is, when
the Court's decisions favorably affected the Court's own institutional
interests. While this position seems right in principle, implementing it
is difficult.
Perhaps the most obvious difficulty is that every decision by the
Court involves the Court's institutional interests to some degree.
Whenever the Court decides a constitutional issue, it is in a sense as-
serting its institutional prerogatives. Even if the decision involves me-
diating between the other two branches, the Court, by deciding the
case, is asserting the power to be the mediator. By the same token,
however, every act of interpretation by the executive branch also
amounts to the executive branch acting as a judge in its own cause.
So it might seem that the notion of an institution's being a judge in its
own cause is not a helpful one.
The only way that notion can be redeemed at all is by taking
account of what must be a presupposition of judicial review: that the
courts are less likely than the other branches to be affected by their
institutional interests. If judicial review is justified-that is, if judges
are to have the last word, even in specific cases-it must be because
the ethos of the judicial branch is more conducive to interpreting the
Constitution correctly than the ethos of the political branches. 30 Ten-
ure and salary protections are supposed to foster this ethos. It is also
not an implausible view; I think most people with experience in both
the judicial branch and either Congress or the executive would say
that the political branches are more concerned with their program-
matic or political interests, which tend to get in the way when legal
questions arise, while the judges (although certainly not without
programmatic interests of their own) are generally more concerned
with figuring out the right answers to legal questions. If this is right,
then the possibility of institutional self-interest by the judiciary does
not warrant executive autonomy in constitutional interpretation to
the same extent that the possibility of executive self-interest requires
executive deference to the courts.
In any event, one well-accepted aspect of the executive branch's
approach to the Constitution might be explained by the possibility of
judicial self-interest. The executive branch routinely stretches consti-
30 A similar justification for judicial review is found in HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS,
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tenta-
tive ed. 1958), and Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1981),
reprinted in A MArrER OF PRINCIPLE 33-71 (1985).
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tutional restraints on its power (as defined by the courts) to their lim-
its, rather than just deciding whether, on balance, a particular action
is justified. Usually, the question in intra-executive deliberations is
not whether a proposed action is constitutional, all things considered,
but whether it is defensible.
Perhaps the use of the "defensibility" standard, instead of asking
whether an executive action is constitutional, is an abuse-an example
of how the executive's programmatic interests interfere with its legal
judgment. But perhaps it can be justified on the ground I have just
discussed: the executive branch is entitled to operate on the assump-
tion that the doctrine developed by the judiciary is to some degree
tainted by the courts' institutional self-interest. That does not mean
the executive may disregard that doctrine and strike out on its own,
autonomous interpretive path: that would give too free a rein to the
executive's self-interest. It means that the executive branch is entitled
to take into account the possibility of judicial self-interest by shading
the doctrine slightly to permit more executive power. This is all quite
rough and crude, but it does help make sense of a persistent executive
branch practice-judging its own actions neither as a court would,
nor according to its own autonomous interpretations, but rather by
their defensibility under current doctrine.
Probably if executive branch lawyers were asked, they would say
that the reason for using defensibility as the standard is that they are
anticipating litigation. If an action is indefensible under existing judi-
cial doctrine, lawyers are professionally obligated to concede its inva-
lidity and, in any event, face certain defeat in court. But this cannot
be a complete explanation, because the use of a defensibility standard
seems to extend to areas where litigation is not anticipated. This is a
puzzle from both directions: it is not clear why the executive branch is
entitled to go that far (instead of just judging constitutionality on the
merits in the way a court would, giving the same weight to precedent
that a court would) and it is not clear why the executive branch can-
not go further (disregarding judicial doctrine and developing autono-
mous interpretations).
Moreover, if anticipated litigation were the only reason for using
a defensibility standard, its use would be unjustified. The executive
branch is obligated to comply with the Constitution, not just to avoid
sure losses in court. Unless there is some coherent account of execu-
tive interpretation that supports the use of this standard, it should not
be used. Even if the actual reason the executive branch uses defensi-
bility as a standard is that it is anticipating litigation (or has slipped
into organizational habits that reflect the anticipation of litigation),
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perhaps that standard can be justified on grounds consistent with the
approach to executive autonomy that I take here.
CONCLUSION: ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE
CONSTITUTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
However one determines the precise scope of the executive's
power to interpret the Constitution, the scope of the executive's au-
tonomous power to interpret the Constitution must depend on institu-
tional considerations of these kinds. Underlying the executive
autonomy view is a notion that constitutional law, as developed by the
courts, is really only the courts' view of the Constitution. The execu-
tive branch, according to this view, is obligated to obey not the courts'
constitutional law, but the Constitution itself.
The underlying fallacy of this view is that it mistakenly separates
constitutional law as the courts have developed it-which basically
means a complex network of precedent-from the Constitution itself.
The courts are also obliged to obey the Constitution. If the Constitu-
tion is different from the precedents that make up constitutional law,
then the courts, as well as the executive, should not be bound by the
precedents.
If there were institutional reasons for the courts to follow prece-
dent more faithfully than the other branches, that would justify a
greater degree of executive autonomy. But most of the reasons for
following precedent apply just as strongly to the executive (and to
Congress). One reason, of course, is the need to maintain a reason-
able stability and predictability in the law. Another is humility: it is
always possible that the decisions reached by previous judges, acting
in good faith, are wrong, but one should hesitate before reaching that
conclusion. That counsel of humility is as applicable to executive
branch officials as it is to judges.
It is sometimes suggested that courts especially must follow pre-
cedent because they are not elected. Elected bodies, it is said, have
another source of legitimacy and therefore need not follow precedent.
But the question is not legitimacy; it is interpreting the Constitution
correctly. There is no reason to think that a democratic pedigree al-
ways helps a branch interpret the Constitution better. In fact, the
opposite is often true; courts sometimes are in a better position to
interpret the Constitution because they are not elected. Perhaps we
can identify other institutional reasons for the courts to follow prece-
dent that do not apply to the executive. If so, that would be a reason
for greater executive branch autonomy in constitutional interpreta-
tion. But the inquiry should proceed in that way, by taking tentative
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steps based on judgments about relative institutional capacities, rather
than by treating the accumulated body of constitutional doctrine as
something that concerns only the courts.
Of course there is a difference between constitutional law and the
Constitution, and there are times when the former should be changed
to make it more consistent with the latter. But an executive branch
official is no more entitled than a judge to claim access to the true
meaning of the Constitution, unmediated by the constitutional law
that has developed. Constitutional law, which in our system has been
the work mostly of the courts, limits all of the branches, in much the
same way.
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